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the federal courts of appeals. Much disagreement exists, how-
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smaller circuits. However, none of these changes, even if implemented,
would affect reality; the volume crisis is not curable by tinkering with the
structure of the courts or the number of people considering appeals. Just
as we cannot build enough prisons to house all our criminals, we cannot
build enough courts to hear all our cases. There are only two ways to
deal with the volume crisis:
One is to decrease the total number of cases that are filed in the
district courts, thus decreasing the total universe of federal cases and
hence the number of judgments from which appeals can be taken.
The other is simply not to permit appeals from all of the final judg-
ments and other decisions of district courts and administrative agen-
cies that are now appealable.'
The trend toward more filings in the district courts is not likely to
change, especially in light of the continuing federalization of state-law
crimes and the creation of more civil causes of action by Congress. This
leaves only one alternative: we must no longer permit appeals for every
dispute. The time has come to accept reality and adopt discretionary re-
view in the courts of appeals.
Through the use of various summary procedures, the courts of appeals
themselves have recognized the need for different approaches to different
types of cases. Meritless appeals are discarded as quickly and with as
little effort as possible. Under a truly discretionary system, the courts of
appeals could avoid the facade of full deliberation and its corresponding
inefficiency and assure that those appeals deserving of full deliberative
treatment will receive it.
Part I of this Essay will explore the volume crisis, the reasons for it, and
projections for the future. Part II will explain how the current summary
procedures are inadequate and examine the pros and cons of adopting a
truly discretionary procedure. Part III will then analyze how the courts
could implement such a plan without hindering the right to an appeal.
I. THE VOLUME CRISIS
There is a statistic for everything, and there are many examples of du-
bious "crises" based on one statistical study or another. However, the
volume crisis is neither invented nor exaggerated. Rather, it is real and
completely identifiable by legitimate research.
The federal circuit courts received 2830 appeals in 1950.2 In 1970,
there were 11,662 appeals, up more than 400%. 3 By 1990, the number of
appeals filed had increased to 41,000, and by 1994, that number was ap-
proaching 49,000-up more than 1700% from 1950.4 Between 1989 and
1. Alvin B. Rubin, Reallocation: A Two-Way Street, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 123 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 1989).






1993 alone, the number of federal appeals rose by more than 25%. 5
Statistics within the Fifth Circuit are similar. In 1960, there were 577
appeals filed in the Fifth Circuit.6 By 1993, that figure was up to 6411, an
increase of over 1100%. 7
To place these figures in perspective, consider the impact on the indi-
vidual judge. In 1960, the Fifth Circuit consisted of seven judges-mean-
ing 82 cases per judge.8 In 1991, there were 13 judges on the court and
6165 appeals-meaning 474 cases per judge.9 These figures do not in-
clude the nonstop motions and petitions for rehearings,10 or the numer-
ous administrative matters that require judicial attention."
The reasons for this skyrocketing of appellate filings are twofold: (1)
the federalization of state crimes, and (2) the congressional enactment of
a multitude of civil causes of action. Neither trend is likely to change. In
United States v. Lopez,' 2 the Supreme Court inspired some hope in those
frustrated by these trends by striking down the Gun Free School Zones
Act as an unconstitutional use of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause. 13 But subsequent cases have come to see Lopez as an ex-
treme example, an aberration, rather than the end of the trend toward
federalizing state crimes. 14 Similarly, congressionally created civil causes
5. David A. Nelson, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 111 (1995) (reviewing Thomas E. Baker's book of same title);
see Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 12, nn. 5-9 (1996) (citing numerous studies of the volume
crisis facing the courts of appeals).
6. Robert M. Parker, Foreword, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 265, 265 (1995).
7. Id.
8. Carolyn D. King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REV. 955, 955 (1991).
9. Id. at 955-56.
10. As many as 496 per judge per year. Id. at 956.
11. Id.
12. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
13. Id. at 1626.
14. See United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases) ("It
appears that United States v. Lopez has raised many false hopes. Defendants have used it
as a basis for challenges to various statutes. Almost invariably those challenges fail."); see
also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 554 (1995). Professor Regan states:
Lopez is [not] likely to inaugurate a major change in the Court's inclination
to uphold federal legislation. Justice Kennedy, speaking also for Justice
O'Connor, makes clear in his concurrence that for him Lopez itself is a hard
case, and Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, shows no sign of any in-
tention to overturn the major Commerce Clause precedents since 1937.
Id. at 554. See also Jay M. Cohen & David J. Fried, United States v. Lopez and the Federal-
ization of Criminal Law, 29 PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 23 ("A careful examination
of the opinion in Lopez, however, reveals that there is little revolutionary about it....
Lopez is simply the case in which the Court finally held that Congress has transgressed the
limit; it is not inconsistent with the precedents."); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of
United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 Duo. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995)
("the doctrinal limits of Lopez will in practice be more modest than its rhetoric suggests");
Charles B. Schweitzer, Comment, Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the Federal
Docket. The Impact of United States v. Lopez, 34 Duo. L. REV. 71, 73-74 (1995) ("The
tone of the majority and concurring opinions indicates that the Justices do not wish to
return, as a practical matter, to the original conception of commerce adhered to by the
Framers, a notion the dissenting opinions reinforce.").
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of action continue to increase. 15 Moreover, even if these trends miracu-
lously ceased tomorrow, the continued growth of the population and
economy still would expand the amount of litigation. Exacerbating these
trends, the proclivity to appeal district court losses is also on the rise. 16
If these trends continue, the courts will experience 90,114 appeals in
the year 2000.17 The courts will face 198,147 appellate filings in 2010 and
428,203 in 2020.18 The more appeals there are, the less attention and de-
liberation a judge may give to each individual case.19 Not only is the
crisis present today, it's going to become catastrophic tomorrow. "There
is no point clinging to the past if the future arrived years ago."'20
II. ANALYZING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
A. SUMMARY PROCEDURES-THE CURRENT APPROACH
Preparation for the future must begin now. After a multitude of stud-
ies, committees, and task forces, our court system has implemented noth-
ing that will equip it to address adequately the exponentially growing
workload. Most of the current proposals center around either (1) addingjudges or staff, or (2) redrawing circuit lines. Neither approach will suf-
fice. Simply adding judges will create only chaos:
[A]s Judge Posner puts it, "beyond a certain point there are too
many judges to deliberate effectively." In particular, as the number
of judges increases, the difficulty of maintaining uniformity of deci-
sions becomes almost insuperable. The members of the court must
struggle even to keep up with other judges' opinions, let alone to
identify and eliminate conflicts in language or result.21
Nor will adding more law clerks help:
With three law clerks, you're about at your limit as to what a singlejudge can absorb. Judges are like funnels: there's a big opening at
the top and all the law clerks and the staff attorneys pour stuff in
there. There's just a little funnel at the bottom. It all has to go
through that one person. And unless the judge widens out that bot-
tom so that it all just drops through rubber-stamped, you're not re-
ally getting any more done.22
15. Parker, supra note 6, at 265.
16. Id.
17. Charles W. Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court System:
Thinking the Unthinkable, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 349, 391 (1994).
18. Id.
19. See Arnold, supra note 2, at 538, 542.
20. King, supra note 8, at 959.
21. Arthur D. Hellman, Courting Disaster, 39 STAN. L. REv. 297, 305 (1986) (foot-
notes omitted) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM (1985)); see Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954)(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The business of courts, particularly of the federal courts, is
drastically unlike the business of factories. The function and role of the federal courts and
the nature of their judicial process involve impalpable factors, subtle but far-reaching,
which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the judicial plant.").
22. Arnold, supra note 2, at 543.
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Similarly, altering the boundary lines for the various circuits, by either
creating fewer larger circuits or more smaller circuits, will not be effec-
tive. Rather, these proposals would create even more problems. On the
one hand, mega-circuits "disturb the clarity and stability of the law, which
in turn increases litigiousness and complicates the disposition of cases."'23
On the other hand, a system of many small circuits "dilutes the federaliz-
ing function of the courts of appeals." 24 Most significantly, redrawing the
circuits will affect neither the number of appeals filed nor the number of
appeals to be heard.
Thus, mere tinkering with size or structure will not suffice. "[A] radical
approach is necessary. Time is of the essence .... [I]t is time to start
thinking 'big.' Incremental [steps] will not solve our problem. '25 The
time has arrived for the federal courts of appeals to adopt a system of
discretionary review.
Current circuit court procedures implemented in response to the vol-
ume crisis underscore the need to allow the courts discretion in approach-
ing different types of cases. More and more, courts are using "summary
calendar" and "conference calendar" treatment of cases rather than issu-
ing decisions after oral argument and full deliberation.26 Similarly, an
increasing number of appeals are decided with one word-"Affirmed"-
or with extremely terse language-"We agree with the decision of the
district court."'27
However, these methods are an inadequate means of combating the
volume crisis. These procedures have caused judges to become in large
part case processors, not jurists, 28 as their full attention is given to only a
few cases each year.29 Judge King notes that under such circumstances,
"a two-track system can slip in to [sic] the modus operandi of even a
conscientious but overloaded judge without the judge even being aware
of it. '' 3° That is precisely what has happened. Many judges are so over-
whelmed that they must use their discretion and devote their full atten-
tion to only a few cases. The remaining cases are given "summary
treatment." Many are affirmed in one word, in a few paragraphs, or on
the basis of an opinion written by staff counsel or a law clerk with no
direction whatsoever from the judge. As Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth
Circuit has said, "Those who believe we are doing the same quality work
23. Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads: Adapt or
Lose!, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 211, 220 (1994).
24. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED-
ERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 114 (1993) (citing John M. Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court,
26 Loy. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980)).
25. Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many
Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 54.
26. Parker, supra note 6, at 265.
27. See Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 52.
28. See King, supra note 8, at 957-58.
29. Id. at 958; see Dragich, supra note 5, at 30-32.
30. King, supra note 8, at 963.
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that we did in the past are simply fooling themselves."' 31 Judge Lay
agrees, stating that "courts of appeals today may provide in many appeals
only an appearance of justice rather than justice itself."'32 In short, a large
part of what now occurs in the federal courts of appeals is "routine, ad-
ministrative decision making instead of the individualized deliberative
processes normally associated with judicial decisions. '33 In a discretion-
ary system, judges would not have to spend as much time and energy on
the undeserving cases, thereby allowing more deliberation on those cases
that warrant it.
B. THE PROS AND CONS OF DISCRETIONARY PROCEDURE
"The question is not whether justice (however you define that rather
slippery term) shall be rationed, but how and to what extent it shall be
rationed. ' 34 The courts already ration justice, and not all appeals deserve
the same level of attention.35 Other than simply limiting the number of
cases filed at the district court level, only discretionary review would have
a tangible impact on the volume crisis. Discretionary review would as-
sure full review of those cases that deserve it, and the quality of the entire
appellate process would be improved: "[T]he discretionary approach
would save time, money, and effort. Those cases that courts do designate
for review would receive better treatment, including traditional collegial
and deliberative appellate procedure, because judges would be processing
fewer other appeals."'36
The main potential drawback to a discretionary system is that "the dis-
cretionary procedure would additionally compromise the ability of cir-
cuits to correct errors and could ration their scarce resources into specific
classes of cases which are deemed more worthy of consideration than
others. '37 As Judge King has explained, "Every nation must be evalu-
ated, in part, by the way in which it deals with its most vulnerable citi-
zens .... [W]hen there is simply not enough judicial time to go around,
the temptation is to give shorter shrift to the cases brought by our most
vulnerable citizens."'38 This danger is real, and it should not be dismissed.
Because of the potential for misuse of this discretion, the system should
monitor the courts of appeals carefully. However, this hazard fails to out-
weigh the merits of adopting discretionary review.
31. Reinhardt, supra note 25, at 53; see Arnold, supra note 2, at 538 ("The volume
problem is causing us to have too little time to think about some of the hard cases as much
as we need to.").
32. Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals,
34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).
33. Steven 0. Ludd, Book Review, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 174, 177 (1996) (reviewing CHRIS.
TOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRA-
TION (1995)).
34. Nelson, supra note 5, at 114.
35. Parker, supra note 6, at 265; Arnold, supra note 2, at 536-37.
36. Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1402-
03 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 1403 (footnote omitted).
38. King, supra note 8, at 963.
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First, to the extent that our "most vulnerable citizens" might be given
"shorter shrift" by our judicial system, there is no indication that a proce-
dure of discretionary review would be any worse than the present system.
Currently, with so much pressure on judges to get cases out while papers
continue to accumulate, there is a real danger that judges will select the
"nonsexy" cases for quick resolution. Similarly, a discretionary system
would create a danger that the courts would ignore the low-profile or
"typical" cases.
While the "it couldn't get any worse" argument is not very comforting
or appealing, it is indicative of just how bad the current deliberative envi-
ronment is and how much a change is needed. As stated previously, the
danger of unequal treatment is real and requires attention. However, it is
not a problem that would be new under a discretionary system.
Second, the benefits of a discretionary system outweigh its potential
drawbacks. Maintaining the facade of full deliberation under the current
system is time-consuming and expensive. A discretionary system would
allow a more honest description of what actually occurs. Furthermore, a
discretionary system would improve the quality of the entire appellate
process because it would ensure that the deserving cases do receive full
deliberative treatment.
Last, a discretionary system would emphasize the importance of having
the most qualified jurists possible at the trial court level, as these courts
would often have the last word in resolving disputes. Highlighting the
importance of having the best district judges possible would benefit the
entire legal system.
III. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW AND THE RIGHT TO
AN APPEAL
There is no constitutional right to an appeal.39 The so-called "right to
an appeal" derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which states that the courts of
appeals have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the dis-
trict courts.40 The explicit wording of this statute does not mandate that
the courts of appeals actually exercise that jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is
generally accepted that § 1291 confers a right to an appeal.41
39. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
656 (1977).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from all final decisions of the district courts."); see Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the
Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 & n.4 (1985) ("It has long
been clear that the right to appeal is statutory, and is not constitutionally compelled.").
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is entitled "Appeal as of Right-How
Taken." FED. R. App. P. 3. However, the actual wording of Rule 3 refers to "[a]n appeal
permitted by law as of right." I&/ Thus, Rule 3 does not create any right to an appeal
independent of what is otherwise permitted by existing law.
41. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 392
(1994) ("Congress has prescribed a primary route, by appeal as of right and certiorari,
through which parties may seek relief from the legal consequences of judicial judgments.");
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,865 (1994) ("Section 1291 of the
Judicial Code confines appeals as of right to those from 'final decisions of the district
1997]
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A system of discretionary review would satisfy that right:
[A]ll that an appeal as of right connotes is that the litigant who lost
in the trial court has a right to put his case before an appellate tribu-
nal, and to have that tribunal consider his contentions that the judg-
ment should not stand. It does not necessarily carry with it a
commitment to particular procedures. 42
A system of discretionary review would fulfill this appellate role. Even if
the court denies review, it still will have considered, to some extent, the
litigant's contentions that the judgment should not stand.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Local No. 42, International Ass'n
of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers,43 the Third Circuit up-
held a denial of oral argument against a due process challenge because
any one member of the panel could have required oral argument and the
vote as to whether to have oral argument came only after the panel had'
received the briefs in each case."4 Similarly, a court of appeals could
adopt a system of discretionary review where the briefs (or a petition for
review) were received prior to any decision and one member of a panel
could require review. Although the right to an appeal is revered,4 5 a dis-
cretionary system would not infringe on either due process or the statu-
courts."'); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 278 (1964) ("We deal with the federal
system where the appeal is a matter of right."); Stelly v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1113, 1116(5th Cir.) ("All citizens have the right to litigate with their government and the right to
appeal any adverse decision of a trial court."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985); In re Mc-
Clinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("Every party is entitled to a full,
considered, and impartial review of the decision of the trial court."); Arrastia v. United
States, 455 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1972) ("A direct appeal from a United States [d]istrict
court to a court of appeals is in effect a matter of right."); Brewen v. United States, 375
F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1967) ("It is settled that an appeal from the judgment of a federal
[d]istrict [c]ourt is a matter of right.").
42. Hellman, supra note 21, at 304 (internal quotations and citations omitted). But see
Lay, supra note 32, at 1151 (quoting Thomas Kallay, The Dismissal of Frivolous Appeals by
the California Courts of Appeal, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 92, 92 (1979) ("If a party can perfect an
appeal as a matter of right, he should necessarily be entitled to the benefits of the entire
deliberative process offered by the forum to which he has taken his appeal."). However,
the courts of appeals, through the use of decisions without oral argument or even an opin-
ion, are already not giving all the benefits of the entire deliberative process. "Once a
litigant is denied his right to have counsel present during oral argument in a case worthy of
appeal, he has indeed lost his right to the full deliberative process of the court." Id. at
1154. "[T]hrough the lessening of the full deliberative process, courts of appeals are, in
reality, invoking a form of discretionary dismissal without calling it such." Id. at 1155.
Thus, discretionary review is merely one more step down the spectrum of denying benefits
of the full deliberative process to unworthy cases. Just as the other procedures satisfy the
right to an appeal, so does discretionary review.
43. 476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
44. Id. at 276.
45. See Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913, 922 (1994) ("The theoretical problem with discretion being the
rule is the effect such a structural reform would have on the federal appellate ideal.");
Dalton, supra note 40, at 62 ("Although its origins are neither constitutional nor ancient,
the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct."); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON STAN-
DARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10 com-
mentary at 14 (1977) ("The right of appeal, while never held to be within the Due Process
guaranty of the United States Constitution, is a fundamental element of procedural fair-
ness as generally understood in this country.").
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tory right of an appeal. 6
In analyzing other procedures created by the courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court has said that "[t]he requirements imposed by that guar-
anty [due process] are not technical, nor is any particular form of proce-
dure necessary. ' 47 Similarly, the guarantees of the statutory right of
appeal should not be viewed as technical or requiring a particular form of
procedure. The procedure due process requires "varies from case to case
in accordance with differing circumstances ....
Some courts have indicated that the statutory right to an appeal is not
absolute. In Free v. United States,49 Judge Posner wrote that "[albusers of
the judicial process are not entitled to sue. . ., period. '50 This limitation
on access to the courts, however, is not limited to abusers of the system.
"At a time of staggering federal caseloads, the need to devise alternative
remedies for classes of litigation that do not imperatively require the full
Article III treatment is urgent."'' s Additionally, "[elven though we es-
pouse the notion that all litigants deserve equal access to the courts, we
have long accepted restricted access and the provision of different treat-
ment for different kinds of disputes. '52
Fifth Circuit Local Rule 47.6, which provides for affirmance without an
opinion, is but one example of how courts may change the procedures of
the appellate process without affecting the statutory right to an appeal.5 3
Local Rule 47.6 is merely an example of "different treatment for different
kinds of disputes."
Thus, even though there is an acknowledged statutory right to an ap-
peal, a system of discretionary review would satisfy that right. The re-
maining question is who has the power to implement such a system.
Clearly, Congress, which created the courts of appeals, could enact leg-
islation implementing a system of discretionary review for those courts.
Additionally, the Supreme Court could provide for discretionary review
for the courts of appeals. The Supreme Court has rulemaking power over
46. But see 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 3901, at 24 (2d ed. 1992) ("[I1t should be clear that a court of appeals cannot properly
refuse decision of a case within its jurisdiction simply because it seems too trivial to consort
with the court's dignity or pressing workload.").
47. Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
48. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949).
49. 879 F.2d 1535 (7th Cir. 1989).
50. Id. at 1536.
51. Id.; see also Lucien v. Johnson, 61 F.3d 573,575 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.); Savage
v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.); Tinker-Bey v. Meyers, 800 F.2d 710(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
52. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 611 (1985); see
Parker, supra note 6, at 268 ("Arguably ... the appeal as of right has already been signifi-
cantly undermined by the prevalent use of summary disposition and affirmance without
opinion by the courts of appeals.").
53. 5TH Cm. R. 47.6 (may affirm without opinion where (1) an opinion would have no
precedential value; and (2) a district court's judgment is not clearly erroneous, sufficient
evidence supports a jury verdict, substantial evidence supports an administrative ruling, a




practice and procedure. 54 The rules adopted by the Supreme Court may
not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'55 But because
discretionary review would not infringe on the right to an appeal, the
Supreme Court could establish the procedure by rule.
Furthermore, the courts of appeals themselves "may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure.5 6 Again, because discretionary review satisfies the
statutory right to an appeal, such a system would not be inconsistent with
the Federal Rules. Additionally, the courts of appeals may have unilat-
eral, "inherent powers" to implement such a plan.5 7
In short, the future cannot be put off any longer. The volume crisis is
crippling our appellate system, and projections for the future are even
worse. The courts must do something now. Discretionary review would
save time, money, and effort and would more honestly describe the sys-
tem currently in place, a system in which courts exercise discretion be-
hind a facade of deliberation. Most importantly, a discretionary system
would benefit the entire appellate process, as it would enable judges to
give full deliberation to those cases that deserve it, instead of spending
time and energy on cases that do not. The future is here. We had better
accept it.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
55. Id. § 2072(b).
56. FED. R. App. P. 47.
57. See Parker & Hagin, supra note 23, at 236; see also Abney v. United, States, 431
U.S. 651, 662 n.8 ("It is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to
establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims.").
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